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Abstract 
The literature addressing attitudes about social policy and the welfare state has been telling us for 
decades that welfare interventions are supported by those individuals who benefit from a specific 
measure. The diffusion of ‘demanding’ active labour market policies (ALMPs), however, challenges 
this relationship. Using a novel dataset, I analyse which individual- and country-level factors explain 
public support for demanding ALMPs in five Western European countries. The results show that 
labour market risk and ideological orientation influence public attitudes towards these ALMPs. 
Thereby, unemployed individuals sympathising with the political right are more strongly opposed to 
demanding measures than employed individuals with the same political preferences. Moreover, 
aggregate support is found to be correlated with the country’s ALMP legacy, varying from high levels 
in Germany and the UK to low levels in Denmark and France. The findings suggest that most ALMPs 
are in fact implemented despite the opposition of their beneficiaries. 
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Introduction  
The literature addressing attitudes on social policy and the welfare state has been telling us for decades 
that welfare state interventions are supported by individuals who directly benefit from a specific 
measure (Ferrera, 1993; Forma, 1997; Andress and Heien, 2001). In other words, social risks and 
support for social policy coincide, and consequently, the welfare state becomes the battleground 
between vulnerable and less vulnerable groups over the extent and nature of these policies (e.g., Korpi, 
1983).  
This self-interest-based argument has been corroborated in many empirical studies and for different 
social policy domains. For instance, individuals from lower social classes favour redistribution, while 
individuals from higher social classes back market-based solutions (e.g., Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; 
Svallfors, 1997). Jobseekers support policies ensuring them a decent standard of living, while 
employed and affluent workers are sceptical of such schemes, as these potentially increase their taxes 
(Baslevent and Kirmanoglu 2011; Rehm, 2011). Women are more supportive of the welfare state, and 
particularly of family-related services, because they are likely to rely on such measures at some point 
in their working lives (Edlund, 1999; Svallfors, 1997; Baslevent and Kirmanoglu 2011). Finally, 
pension schemes are especially popular with elderly respondents, but enjoy very broad support 
because everybody expects to benefit from them one day or another (e.g., Ferrera, 1993; Blekesaune 
and Quadagno, 2003; Bonoli and Häusermann, 2009). 
However, during the last three decades, we have been confronted with the diffusion of a type of social 
policy that challenges the relationship between need/risk and support for the respective intervention. 
Our knowledge of the micro-level determinants of social policy attitudes is called into question by 
activation measures or, more precisely, by some types of active labour market policies (ALMPs). 
Conventional wisdom suggests that ALMPs are supported by individuals at risk of unemployment (i.e., 
the outsiders, e.g., Rueda, 2007), as these measures foster labour market access.  
While self-interest-based support patterns are undisputed for so-called “enabling1” ALMPs (e.g., job-
search assistance and training), these do not seem straightforward for so-called “demanding” ALMPs. 
Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl (2008: 5) define demanding ALMPs as measures that put pressure on the 
unemployed to accelerate their labour market reintegration by i) tightening individual job search 
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requirements, ii) curtailing the duration and generosity of passive benefits, and iii) introducing 
monitoring schemes supervising the job search process. Examples of such policies include sanctions 
for a lack of job search effort and broadening the definition of acceptable work to include occupations 
that do not match previous skill or revenue levels (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 2008: 5; Clasen and 
Clegg, 2011; Bonoli and Natali, 2012; Knotz, 2014).  
Since these demanding measures diffused so successfully and, as shown by Knotz (2014), even prevail 
in Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, likely also the 
beneficiaries of these measures see their utility and support them. In fact, labour market participation 
is pivotal, particularly in modern societies. It not only ensures economic independence but also heavily 
impacts each individuals’ identity, prestige, social embeddedness, and psychological wellbeing (for an 
overview, see Brand, 2015). Thus, unemployed individuals should support measures that help 
overcome the hardship and stigma attached to this status – even if it comes at a substantial cost. An 
alternative explanation for the diffusion of these measures is based on ideological preferences. 
Plausibly, demanding ALMPs are supported by a broad coalition of right-oriented partisans who, 
independent of their labour market position, attribute unemployment to moral hazard requiring 
conditionality and sanctions to be countervailed (e.g., Daguerre, 2007; Bonoli, 2013).  
Inquiring into the micro foundations of demanding ALMPs is a further step to unpacking the 
multidimensionality of ALMP measures (Bonoli, 2013; Nelson, 2013; Vlandas, 2013). Moreover, it 
helps distinguish individual preferences from party or union strategies, advancing the understanding of 
ALMP politics (Knotz, 2014; Clasen et al, 2016: 33). I thus analyse the question: who supports 
demanding ALMPs, where and why? In more detail, I inquire whether and how labour market risk, 
ideology and their interaction influence attitudes towards these policies in five Western European 
countries (Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and the UK) at the height of the economic 
crisis in 2010.  
To complete the picture and following the insights from the literature on the contextual determinants 
of social policy preferences, I inquire whether the institutional settings – in this case, ALMP legacies – 
are correlated with the support for demanding ALMPs (Kumlin 2004; Larsen 2007; Jaeger 2009). In 
fact, the institutional feedback hypothesis predicts that the aggregate public opinion favours measures 
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that correspond to the ideological roots of the existing ALMP scheme the most. The reason behind this 
logic is that institutional features affect the way the unemployed are framed. In turn, these frames 
affect voters’ preferences and, by consequence, as suggested by Brooks and Manza (2006), 
government policy-making (Larsen, 2007). I illustrate this relationship by looking at Switzerland and 
Denmark, which share a tradition of human capital-based ALMPs whose aim is primarily to decrease 
the structural skills mismatch and avoid marginalisation of the unemployed (Nicaise, et al. 1995; 
Bonoli, 2013); at the UK whose model was instead heavily influenced by the US workfare approach 
that attributes individual responsibility to the jobless (King, 1995; Lødemel and Trickey, 2001; 
Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Finally, I include France, Italy and Germany that are situated 
between these extremes and focus on social integration through occupational measures (cf. Barbier 
and Fargion, 2004; Daguerre, 2007).  
Illustrating the relationship between institutional legacies and aggregate support for policies involving 
demands and conditionality is particularly interesting in times of increasing concern with welfare state 
freeriding, as such policies may gain relevance in other welfare domains, such as the regulation of 
immigrants’ welfare access.  
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the theoretical foundation and 
develop several hypotheses regarding how labour market risks and ideological preferences affect 
individual attitudes towards demanding ALMPs and how institutional legacies are related to aggregate 
levels of support. To test the hypotheses, I run several ordinary least square (OLS) models. Next, I 
discuss the results, and the final section concludes by discussing the main findings and their 
implications.  
 
Theory  
Origin and characteristics of demanding active labour market policies  
In the 1980s, governments in OECD countries started adopting ALMPs because, in an austere 
economic context, expanding passive benefits was no longer a viable solution for the new social risks 
– especially the skyrocketing unemployment rates – that were increasingly putting new demands on 
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the welfare state (Bonoli, 2013). It is well-known that ALMPs include a set of heterogeneous 
measures ranging from training courses to job search monitoring schemes. The literature proposes 
different ALMP typologies; however, most of these distinguish between “enabling”, i.e., human 
capital investment-based, and “demanding” policies (King, 1995; Torfing, 1999; Eichhorst and Konle-
Seidl, 2008; Bonoli, 2013; Nelson, 2013). This dichotomy originates from the ideological roots of the 
first ALMP schemes implemented in the 1950s in Sweden (enabling) in contrast with those initiated in 
the 1980s in liberal countries (demanding). While in social-democratic countries, training-based 
ALMPs prevent the marginalisation of individuals with low or obsolete skills and optimise the match 
between labour demand and supply (Nicaise, et al. 1995; Lødemel and Trickey, 2001; Bonoli, 2013); 
in the US and UK, demanding that ALMPs try to accelerate the labour market reintegration of the 
unemployed, who are held individually responsible for lacking work (King, 1995; Daguerre, 2007; 
Bonoli 2010: 439). Currently, virtually all countries incorporate some demanding elements; however, 
substantial differences in the overall conditionality intensity of national ALMP schemes persist 
(Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl, 2008; Bonoli, 2013; Knotz, 2014). 
If we concentrate on demanding ALMPs, their setup seems to imply that unemployment is a 
consequence of individuals’ behavioural shortcomings rather than the result of structural problems 
(Daguerre, 2007). This assessment has a series of consequences. First, if it is assumed that the 
unemployed prefer to rely on benefits over working, negative incentives and sanctions become 
essential instruments to accelerate labour market reinsertion (Gilbert, 2002; Hvinden and Johansson, 
2007). Second, demanding ALMPs increase the vulnerability of the unemployed vis-à-vis the demands 
of the labour market, especially regarding concessions in terms of fit and the quality of a new job, e.g., 
lower wages and longer commuting times (Knotz, 2014). Third, these measures stress self-reliance 
and personal initiative. Tellingly, activation policies have been compared to a “trampoline” rather than 
a “safety net” (Giddens 2000). In short, the prevalence of demanding ALMPs has changed the 
understanding of social rights from being universally granted to being an entitlement to be “earned” 
through individual effort and compliance with the system (Bonoli and Natali, 2012; Gilbert, 2002; 
Handler, 2003). The expectation is that workers suffering from high levels of labour market risk are 
the most affected by the increased pressure entailed in this welfare re-orientation.  
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The effect of labour market risks on attitudes towards demanding ALMPs  
After clarifying the characteristics of demanding ALMPs, let us now analyse the determinants of their 
support. The literature on welfare state attitudes has unveiled several mechanisms steering individual 
preferences for (particular) welfare programmes
2
. The main hypothesis, however, pits the preferences 
of a homo oeconomicus against those of a homo sociologicus. Rational choice-based motives imply 
that individuals favour schemes that maximise their self-interest by addressing the needs/risks 
associated with a disadvantaged position in society (Svallfors 1997: 290; Kumlin, 2004). The 
sociological literature, instead, stresses the importance of socialisation processes for preference 
building (Glass et al. 1986). Thereby, values (e.g., Feldman and Steenbergen, 2001; Kulin and 
Meulemann, 2015), religion (Stegmueller et al., 2012), and (political) ideology (Westholm, 1991; 
Margalit, 2013) gain importance. Thus, I analyse the effect and interaction of self-interest and ideology 
on preferences for demanding ALMPs.  
In the labour market domain, the strongest determinant of self-interest is undoubtedly the current 
unemployment experience (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Rehm, 2011). Not only does 
unemployment lead to the loss of economic independence, it also has negative psychological effects, 
including the loss of social status and self-esteem (Price et al., 2002; Wanberg, 2012). As a 
consequence, I expect that unemployed individuals should reject measures that put additional pressure 
on them, decreasing their support for demanding ALMPs compared to employed individuals (H1a). 
This negative relationship should also apply to indirect sources of labour market risk. Plausibly, a 
previous unemployment experience has a comparable (Naumann et al. 2015), though weaker, effect on 
demanding ALMP attitudes (Emmenegger et al. 2015: 12). Moreover, first-hand experience of 
unemployment among family members and friends may counteract negative stereotypes about the 
behavioural shortcomings of the unemployed and thus decrease support for demanding ALMPs (H1b).  
Finally, as we have known since Stryker (1980), subjective perceptions may determine real action. 
Individuals who believe they are at high risk of unemployment should reject demanding ALMPs more 
decidedly than individuals with secure employment prospects (H1c). Instead, individuals suffering low 
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levels of labour market risk should prioritise the reduction of welfare expenditures and consequently 
taxes, over suboptimal individual matches in terms of quality, skills and the pay of the new job (Svarer, 
2011; Arni et al., 2013) and thus favour demanding policies.  
A wide range of situations increase labour market risk, and self-interest-based reasoning might thus be 
triggered by factors such as part-time work, low educational credentials, and/or low income. 
Analysing these indirect effects in detail is beyond the scope of this contribution; however, I will 
include controls for these alternative explanations.  
 
The effect of political ideology on attitudes towards demanding ALMPs  
Attitudes towards demanding ALMPs are likely influenced by values – particularly political ideology 
(Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Feldman and Steenbergen, 2001; Margalit, 2013). When applying the 
classical left-right distinction to ALMP attitudes, the respondents on the political right should support 
measures involving demands and conditionality more strongly than those on the left, due to attitudes 
towards both self-reliance vs. state responsibility and the prioritisation of economic performance vs. 
individual development.  
In a context of high and “democratising” unemployment (Häusermann, et al., 2014), as was the case at 
the time of the survey, right-wing partisans in particular may be cross-pressured by self-interest and 
ideological preferences. In the event of unemployment, however, right-orientated individuals should 
prioritise self-interest because this is a major shock and consequently may prevent value-based 
reasoning. In line with Margalit’s (2013) suggestion for passive welfare benefits, the effect of 
unemployment
3
 on support for demanding ALMPs should be more pronounced for right-wing 
partisans than for those on the left. Right-wing partisans, who normally favour conditionality, have 
more room to alter their attitudes once they experience unemployment compared with left-wing 
partisans, who already reject demanding ALMPs due to their ideological affiliation. In other words, a 
ceiling effect applies to left-orientated individuals because they reject demanding ALMPs even when 
employed. Additionally, right-leaning individuals might change ALMP preferences due to a learning 
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effect
4
 resulting from a personal experience with ALMPs. In sum, an unemployment event should 
affect partisans on the right more than those on the left (H2). 
 
Differences in aggregate public support for demanding ALMPs 
At the macro level, I analyse the correlation of ALMP legacies with aggregate public attitudes towards 
demanding measures (Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Svallfors, 1997; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; 
Larsen, 2007). Similar to Larsen’s (2007) argument, ALMP legacies are likely to pre-structure the 
elites’ framing of the unemployed and thus affect public opinion by determining the “starting point” 
from which individuals form their attitudes (Larsen, 2007). 
Particularly relevant is the prominence of demanding policies in the original ALMP model, which 
likely influences the extent to which these policies resonate among the public (Bonoli, 2013: 59ff; 
Schmidt, 2002). In the literature, three ALMP models have been identified: the work-first, the human 
capital and the occupational approaches (King, 1995; Løedmel and Trickey, 2001; Barbier and 
Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004; Daguerre, 2007). These strategies vary conspicuously with respect to the 
centrality of demanding ALMPs and the negative behavioural evaluations associated with the 
unemployed. 
In the Nordic countries, ALMPs have been based on human capital enhancement because 
unemployment was problematised as a structural problem (Daguerre, 2007; Barbier and Ludwig-
Mayerhofer, 2004). Thus, the focus rested on increasing the workers’ employability through human 
capital investment; unsurprisingly, in Nordic countries spending on training is especially high (Bonoli, 
2013: 110). Demands and conditionality were thus less central and foremost tied to the request to 
actively seek work (Bonoli, 2013; 71ff.). In liberal welfare regimes, demands have instead always 
been a key aspect of ALMPs. Initially, in the US and later in the UK, governments adopted strict 
supervision and sanctions of the unemployed to countervail moral hazard whilst barely investing in 
human capital training (Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Bonoli, 2013: 110). This strategy was 
paralleled by a long-standing public discourse associating unemployment with idleness and with 
fostering a dependence culture (Schmidt, 2002). Finally, the continental countries are generally 
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classified as falling between these two approaches, applying strategies that focus on social integration 
relying on occupational programmes that work with moderate levels of human capital investment 
(Barbier and Fargion, 2004; Daguerre, 2007; Bonoli, 2013). This focus is clearly recognisable in the 
prominent role taken by the concepts of social solidarity and exclusion avoidance in these countries’ 
welfare reform debates (Esping-Anderson, 1990; Schmidt, 2002). The importance of demands and 
conditionality in the original ALMP model should influence the framing of unemployment, and thus 
affect public support for demanding ALMPs, with the expectation being that support should be highest 
in the UK and lowest in Denmark, with the other countries situated somewhere in between.  
However, in recent decades, demands and conditionality have become increasingly important in most 
countries (Knotz, 2014; Nelson, 2013). In particular, Denmark experienced a dramatic departure from 
its low- to high-demanding approach in 1994. The definition of an acceptable job was thereby 
enlarged dramatically and the benefit length cut substantially (Knotz, 2014). Similarly, the Schröder 
government in Germany departed fundamentally from the continental trend by implementing the Hartz 
IV reforms, which converged towards a liberal route (Fleckenstein, 2012). However, Italy, France, and 
Switzerland did not experience structural ALMP reforms, but increased demands only incrementally 
(Løedmel and Trickey, 2001; Knotz, 2014). Tellingly, the work-incentive intensity index proposed by 
Bonoli (2013: 34
5
) shows that Denmark, UK and Germany have the strictest rules followed by 
Switzerland, France and Italy. 
Based on the institutional feedback logic, these reforms should influence the aggregate opinion, 
leading to increased support for demanding ALMPs in Denmark and Germany (Larsen, 2007). 
Because of these policy changes, I expect a distinction between high aggregate support for demanding 
ALMPs in high-conditionality countries, i.e., the UK and, more recently, Denmark and Germany, and 
low aggregate support for demanding ALMPs in low-conditionality countries, i.e., Switzerland, Italy 
and France (H4).  
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Data and operationalisation  
The dataset 
To operationalise attitudes towards demanding ALMPs in detail and with multiple indicators, a 20-
minute online survey on public perceptions of unemployment policies was conducted in October 2010 
in Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and Switzerland
6
. Approximately 1,500 valid responses 
were obtained in each country. 
The response rates vary from approximately 4 per cent in the UK to 25 per cent in Switzerland (cf. 
Schemer and Wirth, 2013, Table 1OA in the online appendix). As discussed in Sax et al. (2003), low 
response rates are not a problem in and of themselves, but they can become problematic if the sample 
is biased. This issue is widely discussed in the literature. The underrepresentation of particular 
populations can have different causes, for instance, satisficing answers
7
, different internet access 
opportunities, data security concerns and the higher likelihood of respondents not completing an 
online survey than of them not completing a postal survey with several reminders (cf. Berrens et al., 
2003: 3-4; Sax et al., 2003). To avoid distortions in the analyses, I apply weights (see Schemer and 
Wirth, 2013). The weighting variable considers age, gender and education and acts to correct for the 
underrepresentation of particular groups in specific countries. The weighting has been truncated at a 
maximum of eight. Truncation is suggested and applied in major electoral surveys, although the 
extreme value is subject to debate (De Bell and Krosnick, 2009; cf. Schemer and Wirth, 2013). 
 
To contextualise the validity of the present database, I compare the variable that is available both in 
the present database and in the ESS (Round 4 in 2008) and test whether the two surveys’ summary 
statistics are equivalent. Specifically, I use the “governments should reduce differences in income 
levels” item, which is included in the ESS for Denmark, France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK 
(data for Italy is not available). When comparing the means, medians and standard deviations of this 
variable, I obtain slightly higher values for the new data
8
. However, overall, the comparisons of the 
two databases suggest that the quality of the data at hand is adequate.  
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The dependent variables: attitudes towards demanding ALMPs 
To operationalise attitudes towards demanding ALMPs
9
, I rely on an index that is constructed by 
running a factor analysis on four items of the questionnaire (Table 1). These questions were chosen 
because, as discussed above in the theory section, they measure precisely the three principal 
characteristics of demanding ALMP.  
First, I operationalise increasing self-reliance, with the statement: “Unemployed people should accept 
more responsibility for themselves”. Second, sanctions are measured with “Tougher sanctions [should 
be taken] against people who refuse to accept reasonable job offers”. Last, individuals’ readiness to 
make concessions and to take suboptimal jobs is operationalised with the following items: 
“Unemployed people should be willing to accept privations (such as longer commutes or relocation)” 
and “Unemployed people should make more of an effort to adapt to the needs of the labour market”. 
These items were all gauged on a scale from 1 to 5 (strongly disagree to strongly agree).  
 
Table 1: about here 
The factor analysis shows that the four items load on one factor and thus form a strong uniform scale 
with an eigenvalue of 1.77. In the following analyses, I use this continuous factor as the dependent 
variable.  
 
The independent variables 
I operationalise self-interest in terms of three sources of labour market risks. First, I use a dichotomous 
variable that captures whether the respondent was unemployed and available or actively looking for a 
job at the time of the survey. Second, a dummy variable captures whether the individual had been 
unemployed at least once in his or her life. Third, I measure indirect risks with a question regarding 
whether the respondent had a family member or friend who had been unemployed in the 12 months 
prior to the interview. Next, I measure political orientation on a 10-point scale (1=left and 11=right).  
Attitudes towards ALMPs may be co-determined by numerous socio-structural variables: I control for 
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part-time work (yes/no), gender (female), age (in years), income level (five categories), educational 
level (low/medium/high), retirement (yes/no) and inactivity, i.e., invalidity and sickness (yes/no). 
Moreover, I capture the respondents’ occupation according to the one-digit International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08)
10
, union membership (active/passive or non-member), and 
nationality (native/foreigner).  
The individual-level models include all control variables and country fixed effects
11
.
 
As a robustness 
check, I estimate separate logit and OLS models for support for the individual policies (high/low 
support), and the results remain stable
12
.  
 
Empirical results  
Labour market risk and support for demanding ALMPs 
In the first step, I test whether individuals who experience(d) objective or subjective labour market 
risks are supportive of demanding ALMPs.  
 
Table 2: about here 
 
The results show (Model 1, Table 2) that a current unemployment experience has the strongest 
negative effect on attitudes towards demanding ALMPs (H1a). This finding contradicts the 
assumption of the new social risk, social investment and some of the insider-outsider literature that 
vulnerable workers favour ALMPs. Rather, demands and conditionality appear to put off the 
beneficiaries of these measures.  
Similarly, previous unemployment and indirect unemployment significantly decrease support for these 
ALMPs (H1b). The coefficients for the temporally distant or more indirect risks, as expected, are 
smaller. Furthermore, Model 2 shows that individuals perceiving a high degree of labour market risk 
have a conspicuously less favourable attitude towards demanding ALMPs than respondents who are 
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sure to remain employed (H1c). Overall, the expectations from the first set of hypotheses are 
corroborated.  
The models also reveal that some control variables function in line with the self-interest logic. Part-
time work decreases support for demanding policies, perhaps because these individuals are more likely 
to be on fixed-term contracts or to lose their employment in the event of job cuts. Moreover, 
individuals with higher income levels support demanding policies more than individuals with the 
lowest income levels. Finally, union members, who might be more sensitised to unemployment issues, 
favour demanding ALMPs significantly less than previous union members or non-members.  
 
Political ideology and support for demanding ALMPs  
Concerning political ideology, Model 1 (Table 3) shows that the more a respondent adheres to a right-
wing political ideology, the more he or she supports demanding ALMPs.  
Table 3: about here 
Model 2 shows that the interaction effect of ideology and unemployment – which is the most direct 
measure of labour market risks – is highly significant. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship postulated in 
H2 and shows that unemployed individuals are always less supportive of demanding ALMPs 
compared with employed individuals (even though the effects for the extreme left are non-significant).  
 
Figure 1: about here 
 
However, the difference between individuals on the political right is striking. We clearly observe that 
if a right-leaning individual is unemployed, he or she clearly favours demanding ALMPs less than an 
employed individual with the same ideological background. To render the magnitude of the effect 
more precisely, I estimated predictive values for different respondent profiles (see Table 1A in the 
appendix). First, it is useful to mention that the dependent variable ranges from -2.5 to 1.3 and has a 
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standard deviation of 0.85. Estimating the predicted level of support for demanding ALMPs for an 
unemployed person with an extreme left ideology, we obtain a value of -0.61. On the other extreme, 
we have an employed, right-wing supporter (0.53)
13
. The most interesting difference, however, is 
found between the unemployed right-wing supporter (-0.32) and the employed one (0.53), which 
amounts to one standard deviation of the dependent variable 
14
.  
If unemployment “offsets” ideological preferences lastingly (Naumann et al., 2015), the popularity of 
demanding ALMPs should suffer in the long run, particularly in those countries where youth and those 
in the more affluent strata (e.g., middle class) are affected by increasing labour market risk.  
 
Country differences in aggregate support for demanding ALMPs 
Last, in terms of aggregate support levels for demanding ALMPs, Figure 2 shows that, on average, 
respondents in Germany and the UK are more and respondents in France and Denmark are less 
supportive of these ALMPs. Finally, Switzerland and Italy tend to show negative levels of support; 
however, the result is non-significant.  
 
Figure 2: about here 
 
In line with its ALMP model, respondents strongly favour demanding ALMPs in the UK. The same 
pattern applies to Germany, even though this country only recently departed from the continental and 
moved towards the liberal route (Hartz IV reforms) (Fleckenstein, 2012). German support for 
demanding ALMPs might have remained high (May and Schwanholz, 2013) because of its excellent 
labour market performance during the crisis. In fact, unemployment levels remained very low, and 
consequently, the public might have concluded that the new system contributed to positive economic 
developments (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). In contrast, the Danes still seem to favour the original 
Nordic approach rather than the current conditionality- and demand-based system, which Knotz (2014) 
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shows is the strictest in Europe. As research on the negative media coverage of the activation 
programmes in Denmark shows (BLINDED 2017), it is possible that the public might oppose policies 
that are apparently unable to adequately address labour market challenges. Alternatively, the public 
could react to the misalignment of demanding ALMPs and the human capital framing of the original 
activation model. Further research is required to determine which of these explanations is more 
plausible and whether politicians will react to these aggregate preferences as expected by Brooks and 
Manza (2006). Next, French respondents are very sceptical of demanding ALMPs, a position that 
might stem from France’s occupational ALMP legacy and ideological tradition of prioritising self-
determination and individual liberty over state intervention (Lødemel and Trickey, 2001). Finally, as 
expected, Switzerland is situated somewhere between the extremes. In sum, these results seem to lend 
support to the theoretical expectation that aggregate public opinion correlates with the institutional 
setting (H4).  
 
Conclusion 
Decades of research demonstrates that social policies are supported most strongly by their 
beneficiaries (e.g., Ferrera, 1993; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Svallfors, 1997). My study challenges 
this result, showing that this relationship does not apply to demanding ALMPs, which have 
successfully and lastingly diffused across OECD countries.  
Indeed, the results indicate that unemployed individuals are less supportive of demanding ALMPs than 
employed ones, even though these measures help them re-access the labour market. Additionally, I 
found that ideology moderates the effect of risk exposure. To be precise, employed right-leaning 
partisans have substantially more favourable attitudes towards demanding ALMPs than their 
unemployed counterparts.  
At the aggregate level, support for demanding ALMPs correlates with ALMP models, as support is 
highest in countries with a history of liberal-based and lowest in countries with human capital-based 
ALMP legacies. Interestingly, even though Germany and Denmark departed from their original ALMP 
model, substantially increasing demands and conditionality, respondents support demanding ALMPs 
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more strongly in Germany (cf. Knotz, 2014). Presumably, the excellent economic performance during 
the crisis conveyed to German respondents that the Hartz reforms worked well, while the poor 
development in Denmark possibly called into question these ALMP reforms.  
My findings raise several implications. First, clearly the diffusion of demanding ALMPs has not been 
demanded by their “beneficiaries”. Rather, even left-dominated governments (e.g., in Germany and 
Denmark) are willing to introduce demands, likely because they focus on insiders’ interests (Rueda, 
2007; Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2013) and assume that the unemployed react with political apathy to their 
situation (Scholzman and Verba, 1979). This resonates with the “blame avoidance strategy”, whereby 
governments seeking to retrench the welfare state will concentrate on those groups who are least likely 
to punish them electorally (Pierson, 1996).  
However, since the middle class is increasingly affected by labour market risk (e.g., Häusermann et al. 
2014), in the future, governments could begin to encounter opposition by a broad alliance of left 
partisans and vulnerable workers that is independent of their ideology or social origin. The middle 
class has always been pivotal in the welfare coalition and thus might mobilise against policies that 
increase demands on jobseekers, following Brooks and Manza (2006), possibly stopping demanding 
ALMPs on their road of success. Doubtless, more research is needed to clarify the long-term political 
implications of the changing labour market risk structure, especially considering the scarring effects 
affecting millions of young unemployed (Naumann et al. 2015).  
Second, support for particular policies tends to follow path-dependent patterns paralleling the 
institutional context, which here is the ideological orientation of the original ALMP models. 
Transferring the findings to other welfare domains, conditionality-based policies appear to be more 
easily defended in contexts where welfare state dependence is framed in terms of individual 
behavioural shortcomings. However, the results also suggest that this framing is not set into stone: 
successful political reforms and good economic conditions may convince a broad(er) audience of 
demands’ usefulness, even in contexts of spreading labour market risk. 
Finally, since demands can be attached to any type of ALMP or social policy, we should analyse more 
closely the actual structure of ALMPs. The literature shows that different programmes mobilise 
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different (coalitions of) supporters (Vlandas, 2013; Bonoli, 2013; Nelson, 2013). Disentangling the 
multidimensionality of ALMPs is a step in the right direction; however, up-to-date conditionality and 
demands have been neglected since data are often lacking. If increasing training expenditures at first 
sight benefit and are supported by parties catering to individuals suffering from labour market risk, 
this should only be the case if these schemes are non-demanding. Concisely, the design of a measure 
may change support patterns dramatically. Survey experiments could be the right instrument for 
studying the underlying mechanisms in more detail. Moreover, it would be interesting to approach this 
research question with longitudinal data to analyse the effect of economic developments on 
preferences, as well as to analyse the preferences of ALMP participants for both enabling and 
demanding measures to test whether actual participation changes support patterns compared to “mere” 
risk exposition. 
In the current era of economic instability and immigration, labour market vulnerability will remain 
high on European countries’ agendas. This is likely to also be true for welfare state reforms, 
particularly those pushing welfare support away from unconditional social rights. For future research, 
it will be important to consider the differences in the “terms and conditions” of ALMPs, both to 
pinpoint the political determinants behind these reforms and to better understand their social 
consequences. 
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Notes 
1) Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl (2008) define enabling ALMPs as policies such as job-related 
training, fiscal incentives to employers and employees, and specific social services, such as 
childcare. 
2) Analysing alternative explanations, such as socio-tropic motives, where individuals adapt their 
preferences depending on the perception of the overall economic context - or the elites’ 
interpretation thereof (e.g., Kumlin 2004), and deservingness frameworks (van Oorschot 2006) 
is beyond the scope of this article.  
3) In the analyses where I test the effect of the interaction between self-interest and ideology, I 
focus only on unemployment rather than on other forms of labour market risk.  
4) In this framework, I am unable to test this argument with longitudinal data; refer to Margalit 
(2013) for such a study. 
 
5) The index combines short-term replacement rates, systematic activation (every beneficiary 
receives an offer after a given time) and continuing job search requirements and verification 
during participation in ALMPs; for more details, see Bonoli (2013: 34ff.). 
6) The data collection was the joint work of NCCR Democracy Module 4, particularly IP 13 (cf. 
Schemer and Wirth, 2013). The country selection was determined by the scope of the overall 
project, which focuses on Western Europe, and by the languages covered within the research 
team. 
 
7) Satisficing answering strategies are often due to the respondents’ low cognitive ability. These 
systematic answering patterns (i.e., assigning the same answer to entire batteries) are 
problematic because they affect data quality. Here, I exclude respondents who provided 
acquiescent answers (Krosnick, 1991), which was the case for 6.14% of respondents with low 
levels and 0.84% of respondents with high levels of policy-specific sophistication. These 
exclusions are legitimate because half of the questions were formulated with negative wording 
and half were formulated with positive wording; hence, these answers likely do not 
correspond to real preferences. These exclusions may come at the expense of biasing the 
sample; however, the disadvantage of having fewer observations with lower educational 
attainment (and hence applying higher weights for these cases) is theoretically less 
problematic than that from having answers that do not correspond with true preferences.  
 
8) The mean of this variable in the present database is 3.867, and its standard deviation is 1.090. 
The same variable in the ESS (2008) has a mean of 3.897 and a standard deviation of 1.017. In 
addition, when analysing the country-specific means and standard deviations as well as the 
distribution for some sub-samples (employed/unemployed) of respondents, the summary 
statistics are similar (cf. Table 2OA in the online appendix).  
 
9) For descriptive statistics, refer to Table 3OA in the online appendix. 
 
 
10) The International Standard Classification of Occupations provided by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) allows for the classification and grouping of occupation types. I rely on 
the one-digit codes (ISCO-08), which correspond to a very general classification of occupation 
types: 0) armed forces, 1) managers; 2) professionals; 3) technicians and associate 
professionals (technicians); 4) clerical support workers (clerks); 5) service and sales workers; 
6) skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers; 7) craft and related trade workers; 8) plant 
and machine operators, and assemblers; and 9) elementary occupations. 
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11) I decided to include country fixed effects because I am interested in studying attitudes towards 
demanding ALMPs, i.e., ideal-typical strategies, rather than inquiring into support patterns 
towards nationally implemented ALMP schemes. Moreover, the number of unemployed 
respondents is rather low. Thus, splitting samples unnecessarily, especially when estimating 
interaction results, would lead to too few respondents per cell.  
 
12) See online appendix Figure OA1. 
 
13) If we introduce income into the equation, the observed patterns are reinforced. The profile for 
a low-income, left-wing and unemployed person reaches -0.74, and the high-income, right-
wing, employed counterpart reaches 0.62. 
 
14) The difference increases again for an unemployed, right-wing, low-income person (-0.49) 
compared to the employed, right-wing and high-income respondent (0.62). 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1: Operationalisation of demanding ALMPs 
 Question wording  
 
Factor 
loadings  
1 Unemployed people should make more of an effort to adapt to the needs of the 
labour market  0.74 
2 Unemployed people should accept more responsibility for themselves 0.69 
3 Unemployed people should be willing to accept privations (such as longer 
commutes or relocation) 0.63 
4 Tougher sanctions [should be taken] against people who refuse to accept 
reasonable job offers 0.59 
 Eigenvalue 1.77 
 Number of observations 6614 
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Table 2: The effect of labour market risks on support for demanding ALMPs  
Demanding ALMPs (factor) Model 1  Model 2  
Objective  
unemployment risks 
    
Unemployed  -0.498*** (0.062)   
Previous unemployment  -0.127*** (0.030)   
Indirect unemployment  -0.111*** (0.028)   
Subjective unemployment risks     
Very unlikely (ref.)     
Unlikely    -0.170*** (0.035) 
Likely    -0.263*** (0.054) 
Very likely   -0.341*** (0.062) 
Controls      
Part-time work -0.113** (0.041) -0.070 (0.041) 
Retired°  0.100 (0.053)   
Inactive  -0.040 (0.049) 0.048 (0.076) 
Female  -0.027 (0.031) -0.055 (0.034) 
Age  -0.000 (0.001) -0.003* (0.001) 
Low education level (ref.)     
Medium education level -0.039 (0.041) -0.086 (0.055) 
High education level -0.050 (0.045) -0.093 (0.058) 
Income level 1 (low) (ref.)     
Income level 2 0.102* (0.051) 0.072 (0.071) 
Income level 3 0.111* (0.051) 0.093 (0.068) 
Income level 4 0.169** (0.053) 0.141* (0.067) 
Income level 5 (high) 0.236*** (0.058) 0.202** (0.072) 
Union membership -0.167*** (0.047) -0.149** (0.056) 
Foreigner  0.065 (0.055) 0.036 (0.056) 
Academics (ref.)     
Senior officials 0.042 (0.067) 0.151* (0.074) 
Clerk 0.017 (0.037) 0.030 (0.043) 
Trade/Sales 0.067 (0.059) 0.122 (0.064) 
Services 0.021 (0.046) -0.003 (0.051) 
High skill level  0.004 (0.052) -0.010 (0.060) 
Medium skill level -0.060 (0.091) 0.006 (0.108) 
Low skill level  -0.093 (0.074) -0.238* (0.103) 
Agriculture -0.057 (0.210) -0.132 (0.224) 
Armed forces 0.264* (0.116) 0.276 (0.214) 
Crafts -0.281** (0.105) -0.069 (0.143) 
Country dummies     
Switzerland (ref.)     
Germany 0.193*** (0.047) 0.141** (0.050) 
Denmark -0.180*** (0.048) -0.181** (0.057) 
France -0.175*** (0.049) -0.222*** (0.057) 
Italy -0.018 (0.055) 0.010 (0.062) 
UK 0.219*** (0.044) 0.237*** (0.046) 
Constant  0.067 (0.110) 0.308** (0.119) 
R2 0.113  0.086  
Adj. R2 0.108  0.080  
N 6614  4505  
°Retired were not asked about the probability of becoming unemployed. 
Standard errors are in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 3: The effect of unemployment and ideology on support for demanding ALMP  
Demanding ALMPs 
Model 1  Model 2  
Ideology and interaction     
Left-right ideology 0.086
***
 (0.006) 0.091
***
 (0.006) 
Unemployment*ideology   -0.063
**
 (0.025) 
Objective unemployment risk     
Unemployed  -0.506
***
 (0.062) -0.164 (0.140) 
Previous unemployment  -0.116
***
 (0.029) -0.122
***
 (0.029) 
Indirect unemployment  -0.097
***
 (0.028) -0.098
***
 (0.028) 
Controls      
Part-time work -0.079
*
 (0.040) -0.094
*
 (0.039) 
Retired 0.089 (0.050)   
Inactive -0.015 (0.048) -0.031 (0.047) 
Female  -0.006 (0.031) -0.001 (0.030) 
Age  0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Low education level (ref.)     
Medium education level -0.005 (0.040) -0.013 (0.040) 
High education level -0.008 (0.043) -0.019 (0.043) 
Income level 1 (low) (ref.)     
Income level 2 0.112
*
 (0.050) 0.103
*
 (0.050) 
Income level 3 0.089 (0.050) 0.077 (0.049) 
Income level 4 0.144
**
 (0.051) 0.130
**
 (0.049) 
Income level 5 (high) 0.196
***
 (0.056) 0.177
**
 (0.055) 
Union membership -0.104
*
 (0.045) -0.112
*
 (0.045) 
Foreigner 0.027 (0.054) 0.025 (0.054) 
Academics (ref.)     
Senior officials 0.016 (0.063) 0.017 (0.062) 
Clerk 0.010 (0.036) 0.008 (0.036) 
Trade/Sales 0.030 (0.058) 0.028 (0.057) 
Services -0.015 (0.044) -0.014 (0.044) 
High skill level -0.002 (0.050) -0.001 (0.050) 
Medium skill level -0.075 (0.086) -0.079 (0.086) 
Low skill level  -0.070 (0.072) -0.066 (0.072) 
Agriculture -0.096 (0.211) -0.106 (0.209) 
Armed forces 0.145 (0.119) 0.165 (0.116) 
Crafts -0.311
**
 (0.109) -0.319
**
 (0.113) 
Country dummies     
Switzerland (ref.)     
Germany 0.271
***
 (0.046) 0.269
***
 (0.046) 
Denmark -0.162
***
 (0.047) -0.155
**
 (0.047) 
France -0.106
*
 (0.047) -0.107
*
 (0.047) 
Italy -0.017 (0.055) -0.008 (0.055) 
UK 0.237
***
 (0.043) 0.239
***
 (0.043) 
Constant  -0.484
***
 (0.115) -0.520
***
 (0.114) 
R
2
 0.163  0.164  
Adj. R
2
 0.160  0.160  
N 6614  6614  
°Retired were not asked about the probability of becoming unemployed. 
Standard errors are in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Figure 1: Predicted support for demanding ALMPs based on labour market risks and political 
orientation (all countries) 
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Figure 2: Predicted support for demanding ALMPs per country  
 
 
  
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
.2
S
u
p
p
o
rt
 d
em
an
d
in
g
 A
L
M
P
s
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
G
er
m
an
y
Fr
an
ce
Ita
ly
U
K
D
en
m
ar
k
Prediction of support and 95% confidence intervals.
31 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 1A: Predicted outcomes for selected profiles 
Employment 
status 
Ideology
1)
 Predicted support for 
demanding ALMPs  
Income level Predicted support for 
demanding ALMPs 
Unemployed    Income
2)
   
 Left  -0.61 Low  -0.74 
   High  -1.32 
 Centre  -0.46 Low  -0.61 
   High  -0.31 
 Right  -0.32 Low  -0.49 
   High  0.69 
Employed      
 Left  -0.38 Low  -0.33 
   High  -0.30 
 Centre  0.07 Low  -0.01 
   High  0.15 
 Right  0.53 Low  0.31 
   High  0.62 
1)
 Ideology: left=min, centre=median, right=max; 2) Income: low=min, high=max, other variables at their mean. The models 
including the interaction with income level are not shown but are available upon request.  
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Online Appendix 
 
Table 1OA: Online survey response rates 
 Emails  Complete  Percentage 
(%) 
Switzerland  8815 2272 25.77 
Germany 21854 2223 10.17 
France 34427 2237 6.50 
Italy 13982 2198 15.72 
UK 61268 2234 3.65 
Denmark 21523 2238 10.40 
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Table 2OA: Comparison of datasets  
 ESS, Round 4   Own data   
 Mean Std. 
dev. 
Median  N Mean Std. dev. Median  N 
All countries 
(unweighted) 
3.90 1.07 4 55610 3.89 1.09 4 8454 
All countries * 3.88 1.02 4 55610 3.90 1.09 4 8454 
Switzerland* 3.68 1.01 4 1819 3.78 1.08 4 1503 
Germany* 3.62 1.05 4 2751 4.07 1.06 4 1430 
Denmark* 3.10 1.15 3 1610 3.63 1.25 4 1433 
France* 4.04 1.07 4 2073 4.12 1.02 4 1451 
UK* 3.51 1.07 4 2352 3.65 1.00 4 1433 
Italy* - - - - 4.10 1.00 4 1372 
*Design weights applied. 
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Table 3OA: Descriptive statistics  
 
N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variable      
Demanding ALMP (factor) 6614 0.61 0.47 -2.34 1.40 
      
 
Independent variables       
Unemployed 6614 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Previous unemployment  6614 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Indirect unemployment 6614 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Left-right 6614 5.67 2.43 1 11 
Subjective unemployment      
Very unlikely 4505 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Unlikely  4505 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Likely  4505 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Very likely 4505 0.09 0.29 0 1 
 
Control variables      
Female  6614 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Age  6614 43.66 14.00 15 74 
Retired  6614 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Inactive  6614 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Part-time work 6614 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Union member 6614 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Foreign born 6614 0.06 0.23 0 1 
High education level 6614 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Income level 1 6614 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Income level 2 6614 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Income level 3 6614 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Income level 4 6614 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Income level 5 6614 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Academic 6614 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Senior official 6614 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Clerk 6614 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Sales 6614 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Service 6614 0.15 0.36 0 1 
High skill level  6614 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Medium skill level 6614 0.03 0.19 0 1 
Low skill level 6614 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Agriculture 6614 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Armed forces  6614 0.01 0.08 0 1 
Crafts 6614 0.01 0.08 0 1 
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Figure AO1: Robustness check: single indicators, OLS and logit models 
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